Worker Rights as Human Rights: Wagner Act Values and Moral Choices by Gross, James A.
Articles & Essays
WORKER RIGHTS As HUMAN RIGHTS: WAGNER
ACT VALUES AND MORAL CHOICES
James A. Grosst
I. INTRODUCTION
April 12, 1937 at the National Labor Relations Board "was just wild."
A "great joy" and a "whole feeling of victory.., ran through the office -
[it was] like a carnival almost for that day and days afterward."' On that
day, a divided Supreme Court had upheld the Wagner Act as the law of the
land. Given today's near universal acknowledgement of the triumph of
capitalism and almost universal acceptance of the "free market" values
underlying that economic system, it needs to be recalled that when Franklin
Delano Roosevelt was inaugurated as president of the United States in the
Great Depression year of 1933, the people had lost faith in the virtues of
rugged individualism and the allegedly self-generating forces of economic
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growth. They were receptive to almost any kind of remedial action,
including unconventional experiments in economic policy by the federal
government. Even then, Wagner's National Labor Relations Act received
only a "tepid public blessing" from Roosevelt2 and that came only after
other experiments had failed. Senator Wagner, however, hailed the new law
as a "bulwark of industrial peace and justice.
3
My approach and response to the question of whether we should
return to the principles of the Wagner Act are rooted in the belief that the
basic foundation of law, including labor law, is moral choice - and that
the moral choices we make determine what kind of society we want to have
and what kind of people we want to be. More specifically, it is my
contention that there can be no satisfactory answer to the return to the
Wagner Act question until there is a comprehensive and thorough re-
examination of United States domestic labor law and policy using
internationally accepted human rights principles as standards for judgment.
The concept of human rights, however, has not been an important
influence in the making of United States labor policy. In this country,
workers are considered to have only those rights set forth in specific
statutes or collective bargaining contracts and those statutes and contracts
are subject to shifting political and bargaining power. It is also my
contention, however, that the values underlying the Wagner Act and many,
but not all, of its provisions are most consistent with the values of human
rights.
II. THE VALUES AND THE PROMISE OF THE WAGNER ACT
As I have written elsewhere, the Wagner Act established the most
democratic procedure in United States labor history for the participation of
workers in the determination of their wages, hours, and working
conditions.4 The Wagner Act was not neutral; the law declared it to be the
policy of the United States to encourage the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and to protect workers in their exercise "of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection. 5 This was a fundamental change in public policy, particularly
2. Id. at 147.
3. Id. at 229.
4. James A. Gross, The Broken Promises of the National Labor Relations Act and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act: Conflicting Values and Conceptions of Rights and
Justice, 73 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 351 (1998).
5. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449-50 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
141-44, 167, 171-87 (1944)).
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in regard to the role of government regulation of labor relations. The Act
promised a protected opportunity for workers through power-sharing to
participate in making the decisions that affect their workplace lives. What
was then called industrial democracy was to replace employers' unilateral
determination of matters affecting wages, hours, and working conditions.
The Wagner Act had the potential to bring about a major redistribution of
power from the powerful to the powerless at United States workplaces
covered by the statute.
J. Warren Madden, the first chairman of the Wagner Act National
Labor Relations Board, said that his Board (1935-1940) was "left of
center" because the Wagner Act - which encouraged the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining - "was left of center.",6 He expected
employers to dislike the Act because it reduced their power - "And did
anyone ever in the history of the world rejoice at losing power?"
7
For Wagner, the right to organize and bargain collectively was "at the
bottom of social justice for the worker"8 and was essential for a free and
democratic society. He believed that "the struggle for a voice in industry
through the process of collective bargaining is at the heart of the struggle
for the preservation of political as well as economic democracy in
America." 9 He opposed the tyranny of both free-market laissez faire, in
which "men become the servile pawns of their masters in the factories" and
the authoritarian "super government."' °
Certainly, the right to physical security and subsistence is
indispensable to the enjoyment of all other rights. The Wagner Act labor
policy understood, however, that people need more than physical security
and subsistence. A full human life begins by not having to depend on
others' benevolence, charity, love, pity, or devotion to duty. It also means
that one is not helplessly subject to the arbitrary exercise of power by
others or to the allegedly impersonal forces of the so-called free market.
The Wagner Act understood that this can be achieved only by worker
participation in the economic as well as the political and social aspects of
their lives. It promoted not the pseudo-participation of form with no
substance, but genuine participation where people can influence workplace
decisions.
The right of people to participate in the decisions that affect their lives
is one of the most fundamental principles of democracy - and it is a
fundamental human right (outside the United States, the freedom of
6. James A. Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another Look at Fifty Years of
NLRB Law Making, 39 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 7, 11 (1985).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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association and collective bargaining are recognized as human rights)."
The Wagner Act, therefore, promoted independent labor organization and
collective bargaining as essential to a democratic form of government, not
merely as the consequences of management mistakes. The Act's
dedication to applying principles of democracy and human rights in the
workplace was its underlying strength. The Wagner Act sought to
eliminate the vulnerability that leaves workers at the mercy of others or of
supposedly impersonal economic forces - either of which can transform
them from self-reliant participants in society into helpless victims. The law
was intended to give workers the opportunity to secure their own rights and
interests through participation in workplace decision-making.
IlI. THE WAGNER ACT PROMISES BROKEN
Labor never came close to achieving the system of workplace
democracy envisioned by Senator Wagner. In 1984, a House Labor
Committee concluded not only that the labor law had failed to achieve its
purpose, but also that the law itself was being used "as a weapon to
obstruct collective bargaining" and to create only the illusion of protecting
workers against discrimination. 12 My own study of Wagner-Taft-Hartley
from 1947-1994, a book entitled Broken Promise,13 shows how a policy
that encouraged the replacement of industrial autocracy with a democratic
system of power sharing was turned into governmental protection of
employers' unilateral decision-making authority over decisions that greatly
affected wages, hours, and working conditions. More specifically it
demonstrates how the statute and NLRB case law have come to legitimize
employer opposition to the organization of employees, collective
bargaining, and workplace democracy.
A. Taft-Hartley Act
It began in 1947 with the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner
Act.' 4 Although Congress carried over to Taft-Hartley the Wagner Act
statement that it was the policy of the federal government to encourage
collective bargaining, 15 it added a new declaration of policy saying that the
11. See James A. Gross, A Human Rights Perspective on United States Labor Relations
Law: A Violation of the Right of Freedom of Association, 3 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL. J.
65,70-72 (1999).
12. Id. at 79.
13. JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS
POLICY, 1947-1994 (1995).
14. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 167, 171-87 (1944)).
15. Gross, supra note 4, at 352.
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purpose of the Act is to protect the fights of individual employees. 6
Although there is no necessary conflict between the encouragement of
collective bargaining and the protection of individual rights, many experts
at the time Taft-Hartley became law predicted correctly that this addition
plus language asserting the right to refrain from engaging in collective
bargaining (Section 7),17 the addition of several union unfair labor practices
(Section 8 (b)),' and a provision asserting employers' right of "free
speech" (Section 8(c)),' 9 would be read as a statutory justification for both
the promotion of a policy of individual bargaining and employer resistance
to unionization and collective bargaining.
When the employer free speech language was being considered in the
Senate in 1947, for example, Senator Wagner (who was too ill to attend the
debates on the Senate floor) wrote:
[The] talk of restoring free speech to the employer is a polite way
of reintroducing employer interference, economic retaliation and
other insidious means of discouraging union membership and
union activity thereby greatly diminishing and restricting the
exercise of free speech and free choice by the working men and
women of America. No constitutional principle can support this,
nor would a just labor-relations policy result from it.20
The phrase "employer free speech" concealed the real policy issue: the
extent to which, if at all, employers were to be permitted to exert economic
power through speech in regard to employees' choice of and participation
in unions. Congress and the first Republican-appointed NLRB that applied
Section 8(c) went beyond the notion of protecting an individual employee's
statutory right to choose or reject unionization and the collective bargaining
process; they created an employer right to resist and obstruct unionization.
The change moved labor policy from requiring employer neutrality in the
early years of the Wagner Act to sanctioning active employer resistance to
unionization. The deregulation of employer speech increased the ability of
employers to use their economic power to defeat unionization efforts. Few
democratic societies, other than our own, condone open opposition by
employers to unionization and collective bargaining.
Since many of the most important employment decisions cannot be
individually negotiated, worker's choice is not simply between individual
and collective bargaining but rather between participation in or exclusion
16. 29 U.S.C. § 141.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1944).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1944).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1944).
20. Gross, supra note 11, at 89 (citing Robert F. Wagner, The Wagner Act-A
Reappraisal, 93 CONG. REc. A895, A896 (1947), reprinted in 2 LMRA, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, 935, 938 (1948)).
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from the decision-making process that directly affects their lives. The
concept added to Taft-Hartley of the federal government as a neutral
guarantor of employee free choice between individual and collective
bargaining, and indifferent to the choice made, is clearly inconsistent with
the Wagner Act concept that was retained in Taft-Hartley-of the federal
government as a promoter of collective bargaining. The Taft-Hartley Act
contains both conceptions of the government's role so that the NLRB can
choose between the contradictory statutory purposes and still claim that
they are conforming to statutory intent - leaving the perception that the
meaning of the law depends on which political party won the last election.
B. The White House
Lack of courageous leadership in the White House, no matter who the
occupant, has also contributed to breaking the promise of the Wagner Act.
No president in the last twenty-five years or so has made and endorsed a
clear statement of the rights of workers to organize and bargain
collectively. Strong presidential support can be the difference between
success and failure in Congress. Compare, for example, the Clinton
administration's unwillingness in 1994 to provide the same intense political
support that it gave to the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") to a bill that would have made it illegal for an employer to hire
permanent replacements for economic strikers.
A presidential administration can also change agency policy without
legislative action through its power to appoint agency members. Ronald
Reagan, for example, appointed people to the NLRB who were hostile to
the law they were supposed to carry out. During that period, the national
labor policy became one of maximizing employers' ability to compete in
domestic and foreign markets by deregulating the management end of
labor-management relations. Management's authority to manage was
21elevated above employers' statutory obligations to bargain.
C. Congress
Since 1947 Congress has not used its power to legislate, investigate,
and appropriate in ways that would promote the freedom of association and
collective bargaining. To the contrary, congressional opponents of the
NLRB, in recent years, have sought to achieve deregulation through
appropriation cuts and riders to appropriation bills rather than the
legislative process, often under the guise of balancing the budget.
Congress has done nothing to promote vigorous enforcement of the
21. GROSS, supra note 13, at 246-271.
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law so that at least violators should not be able to profit from their
violations. More than thirty years ago, then NLRB Chairman, Frank
McCulloch, told Congress that the Board's remedies were not sufficient to
achieve the purposes of the NLRA.22 Today those same remedies still do
not deter employers from violating the law. The inadequacy of these
remedies coupled with the delays in issuing remedial orders actually make
it "cost efficient '23 for employers to violate the Act. Enforcement of the
labor law has not been a top priority in the White House or Congress.
D. The Courts
The courts, particularly the Supreme Court, could have issued
decisions that implemented participatory democracy at the workplace, but
instead have chosen to expand employers' unilateral control over the most
important entrepreneurial decisions. These rulings undercut collective
bargaining and, subsequently, the purposes and policies of the Act that
encourage organization and collective bargaining. From Justice Potter
Stewart's classic value-laden 1964 dicta excluding those decisions "at the
core of entrepreneurial control, ' 24 from the obligation to bargain to the
1981 value-judgment-riddled Supreme Court decision in First National
Maintenance Corporation v. NLRBe to the Court's 1992 decision in
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB26, the Supreme Court has issued major rulings that
not only defy the intent of the NLRA to encourage the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining, but also echo "the pre-New Deal
hostility to organized labor that federal labor law aimed to reverse."2' 7
E. Organized Labor
Organized labor has been in a long-term decline. Much of this decline
can be attributed to widespread employer opposition to unionization, but
some of the decline is its own fault. Organized labor has not been able to
shake the unsavory image created by the late 1950's McClellan hearing
which fixed in the public's mind the still-powerful picture of exploited
union members controlled by corrupt and dictatorial leaders whose only
22. Gross, supra note 4, at 361.
23. David L. Gregory, Working ForA Living, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 1355, 1367 (1993).
24. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964).
25. 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (removing employers' decisions to close part of their business
from the list of mandatory subjects of bargaining).
26. 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (where a naked property right trumped workers' freedom of
association).
27. Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere," 46 STAN. L.
REV., 305, 328 (1994).
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interest was personal enrichment.28
Organized labor's political influence has also declined as both major
political parties began moving rightward toward an ideological consensus
that espoused a politics of "centrist" conservatism. Labor's legislative
agenda has been given consistently low priority. Unions must also bear
some of the blame for restricting the scope of bargaining which has fallen
short of the potential envisioned by Senator Wagner. In general, unions
defined for themselves too narrow a role in the operation of the enterprise.
The understanding between labor and management-in which labor was the
junior partner who bargained only in limited areas while allowing
management unrestricted authority to manage-was the product of limited
vision.
F. Employer Resistance
I am persuaded, however, that the determined opposition of United
States employers taken as a whole has been the biggest obstacle to the
Wagner Act policy of organization and collective participation for workers
at their workplaces. As Professor Benjamin Aaron has pointed out,
"employer resistance to unions has deep historical roots and is still strong
and growing. 29  Shortly after a conference at Cornell University
commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Wagner Act, former NLRB
chairman McCulloch deplored "artful anti-collective bargaining
propaganda, ' 30 "countless employer campaigns vilifying unions and
trumpeting employer benevolence as the workers' best friend,' and other
impediments to "basic human aspirations to have a meaningful voice in
shaping one's own destiny., 32 McCulloch also feared that the "social
partnership" of labor and management anticipated by the principles of
Wagner-Taft-Hartley was becoming "increasingly foreign" as the result of
"the growing attacks upon the labor movement" by its management
opponents.33
IV. VALUES CONTRARY To THOSE OF THE WAGNER ACT
Over the years, there have been a number of proposed legislative
changes intended to remedy at least certain aspects of the broken promise.
28. Gross, supra note 13, at 122-123.
29. Benjamin Aaron, The NLRB, Labor Courts, and Industrial Tribunals: A Selective
Comparison, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 35, 35 (1985).
30. Gross, supra note 6, at 17.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 18.
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These suggestions include the following:
* increase the effectiveness of NLRB remedies
" end the permanent replacement of economic strikers
" crack down on the anti-union consulting industry
" improve union access to employees during representation election
campaigns
" lift prohibitions on secondary activity
* minimize employer involvement in representation campaigns by the
use of authorization card certifications
" end the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of
bargaining by permitting bargaining over all issues that directly or
indirectly affect people's working lives
* guarantee employees who vote for a union (at least when their
chosen representative fails to negotiate a first contract) a
grievance procedure with binding arbitration
" allow for minority unions and end exclusive representation
* make the discretionary 10(J) injunction 34 mandatory in cases
involving employees discharged for union activity
" expand the coverage of the Act to extend participation to as many
workers as possible.
Labor history before and after the passage of the Wagner Act helps us
understand why none of these proposals or any other legislative attempts to
redeem the promise of the Wagner Act are likely to succeed. Much of the
debate about the NLRA has focused on such proposals to amend the law
and the strategies, objectives and relative political power of those who
would gain or lose as a consequence of such legislative changes. As stated
earlier, however, the answer to the question about returning to the
principles of the Wagner Act is at its core a question about a choice of
values.
A. The Values of Business and Free Market Economies
Every economic system has historical roots and embodies value
judgments about the individual person, law, private property, liberty, and
the role of government. A particular system and theory are chosen because
they yield policy implications compatible with some one's or some group's
vision of how the world should be.
It is unnecessary to review the well-documented history of how the
legal system, for example, was used in an increasingly market-oriented
society, not only to secure economic and political power for entrepreneurs
and merchants, but also to facilitate a redistribution of wealth in their favor
34. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1998).
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at the expense of workers, farmers, consumers, and other less powerful
people. The common law was a powerful force in facilitating economic
development, particularly through the development of still-prevalent
doctrines of property rights. When these contract doctrines were extended
to treat the employment relation the same as any other contract, the result
was not liberating or rights-endowing for workers.
This was due in part to the values of the judges who created the
doctrines. As Justice Benjamin Cardozo once said, "[tihe decisions of the
courts on economic and social questions depend upon their economic and
social philosophy. 35 These judges, overwhelmingly "solid, independent
men of middle class," were "terrified of class struggle, mob rule, the
anarchists and their bombs, railroad strikers and the collapse of the social
system as they knew it."
36
Employment contract doctrine gave employers a legal basis for
the prerogatives they demanded and which free market ideology
claimed were essential. That was accomplished by importing
into employment contract doctrine the law of master and servant
in a way that not only preserved the masters' authority but also
absolved employers of the duties masters owed their servants.37
In sum, the employment contract became "a legal device for
guaranteeing to management the unilateral power to make rules and
exercise discretion. 38
The values underlying common law employment contract
doctrine are still embedded in U.S. beliefs about economic and
workplace relations. Those values have been reinforced by folk
philosophies such as the "Gospel of Wealth" and "Social
Darwinism" that originally [attempted] to reconcile democratic
[and religious] beliefs in the free individual with the reality of
39concentrated corporate economic and political power.
According to these values, workers should remain unorganized and
cared for by the "natural aristocracy of ability" that controlled business;
4
0
business should be free from government regulation; and the prosperity of
enterprise "was the way, the truth, the consummate social good."'4 People
were poor, therefore, not because of any fault in the system but because
35. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 171 (Yale Univ. Press,
8" ed. 1932) (1921).
36. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 486 (1973).
37. James A. Gross, The Common Law Employment Contract and Collective
Bargaining: Values and Views of Rights and Justice, 23 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 63, 68 (1998).
38. ALAN Fox, BEYOND CONTRACT: WORK, POWER AND TRUST RELATIONS 188 (1974).
39. Gross, supra note 37, at71.
40. RALPH HENRY GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 168 (2d
ed. 1956).
41. FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 485.
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they were personally defective in capacity, or morals, or both.
Unions had no place in the subsequent Scientific Management
approach that imposed tight management control over workers whose
obedience was secured by the use of financial and disciplinary
"incentives." Unions also were excluded from the human relations
movement, the inspiration for current human resource management that
"promote[s] harmony without disturbing management's control of the
workforce.
' ,42
Today, it is an article of faith that survival (and jobs) in this era of
global competition depends on strategies that are favorable to business and
hostile to the core provisions of the Wagner Act and organized labor: the
end of costly contracts with unions; the retention or regaining of
management prerogatives, power and flexibility; the freedom to overcome
other labor cost advantages enjoyed by competitors here and around the
world, and the end of government regulations that interfere with the free
market's distribution of benefits and burdens.
All of that is rooted in values and ideology. The each-versus-all
individualism that drives the free market approach to life induces people
not only to be preoccupied with their own personal self-interest, but also to
accept even the harsh economic and social consequences of the market as
the inevitable results of impersonal forces beyond anyone's control. If the
market is impersonal, moreover, it can be neither just nor unjust. It is
absurd, the argument goes, to demand justice of such a process because
there is no answer to the question of who has been unjust. When bad
things happen to people they are misfortunes, not injustices. As one
distinguished economist put it, "'social justice' is simply a quasi-religious
superstition.
'A3
V. CONCLUSION: A NEEDED NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE VALUES OF
THE WAGNER ACT
The promises made in the NLRA embody fundamentally different
values and conceptions of rights and justice than those underlying the
allegedly free market system. This paper reaffirms the moral superiority
and democratic nature of those NLRA values. It also contends that the
conceptions of workers' rights and social justice underlying Wagner's
statute were subordinated to the values of free market economics and the
rights of property and management. It is not enough to reaffirm that the
provisions of the Wagner Act confirmed that workers were human beings
- not mere resources - and that human beings were not to be submissive
42.Gross, supra note 37, at 72.
43. Gross, supra note 4, at 73 (quoting 2 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE 66 (1976)).
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to employers, markets, or governments. It is not enough to reaffirm that
those provisions promoted individual rights and responsibility, social
obligations, and a democratic approach to employment decisions.
Despite fatalistic views about the futility of trying to reverse the
dominant economic and political value choices, history shows that even
after long periods of political stability abrupt changes occur when other
interests gain prominence. The ability of challengers to redefine a policy
issue is but one reason for such change. Therefore, a new perspective is
needed on the Wagner Act and its underlying values.44
I contend that we need to reexamine U.S. domestic labor policy using
internationally accepted human rights principles as standards for judgment.
The international human rights movement and organizations, human rights
scholars, and even labor organizations and advocates have given little
attention to worker rights as human rights. As one United Nations
document put it, "despite the rhetoric, violations of civil and political rights
continue to be treated as though they were far more serious, and more
patently intolerable, than massive and direct denials of economic, social
and cultural rights." 45  An honest and systematic reexamination and
reassessment of our own U.S. labor law would be a long overdue beginning
toward the promotion and protection of worker rights. The Human Rights
Watch report, Unfair Advantage: Workers' Freedom of Association in the
United States Under International Human Rights Standards, was a most
recent major first step in that direction.
46
I also contend that the values underlying the Wagner Act, and most
but not all of the Act's provisions, are the values most consistent with
human rights values. At its core, for example, was the promotion and
protection of the freedom of association which "is the bedrock workers'
right under international law on which all other labor rights rest. 47 The
right to bargain collectively follows directly as an inherent aspect of the
44. Gross, supra note 4, at 382-83.
45. Gross, supra note 11, at 68.
46. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS (2000).
47. Id. at 13. For example, Human Rights Watch pointed out in its report, Unfair
Advantage: Workers' Freedom of Association in the United States under International
Human Rights Standards, some provisions of the Wagner Act, such as the exclusion from
coverage of agricultural and domestic workers, openly conflict with international human
rights norms that affirm the right of "every person" to form and join trade unions and to
bargain collectively. Citing these exclusions, the denial by many states of the right to
bargain collectively to public sector employees, as well as additional exclusions in the Taft-
Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act, Human Rights Watch concludes that "millions of
workers in the United States are excluded from coverage of laws that are supposed to
protect the right to organize and bargain collectively." As a consequence, "workers who fall
under these exclusions can be summarily fired with impuinity for seeking to form and join a
union." Id. at 10 and 29.
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freedom of association. Consequently, the Wagner Act was intended to
enable workers to obtain sufficient power to make the claims of their
human rights both known and effective so that respect for their rights was
not dependent solely on the interests of the state, their employers, or others.
The Wagner Act was a moral choice against servility. Servility is
incompatible with human rights.
Wagner's law also reflected his understanding of the necessary
interrelatedness of political and economic rights. He recognized that for
those without bread, the guarantees of freedom of association, freedom of
speech, and political participation are in reality meaningless. He also knew
that it was not only the state - but also the employer - that has the explicit
power to violate people's rights. He knew that a human being has a right to
be free from domination regardless of the source. Making it the policy of
the federal government to encourage and protect the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and prohibiting interference with labor
organization and collective bargaining emphasize Wagner's understanding
that government support and protection are absolutely essential to the
exercise of participatory rights at the workplace. The fundamental rights
that people need to live a human life, therefore, include not only those a
government must not invade but also those a government must provide or
promote. Moreover, Wagner's Act was intended to have the government
protect and empower those most in need of protection and empowerment.
If the values of the Wagner Act are understood for what they actually
are, that is, human rights values, it changes the scheme for giving certain
rights priority over other rights. If freedom of association is recognized as
a human right, for example, then it gets first priority. That does not mean
that property rights, efficiency, or management rights are forsaken; it
simply means that those rights no longer are entitled to receive the first
priority that courts, administrative agencies, and labor arbitrators have
historically given them. It would mean that the fundamental human right
of freedom of association should trump both property and speech rights of
the employer at the workplace. This could be accomplished without
unfairly damaging legitimate employer interests.
48
Workers' freedom of association is being violated in this country.
Yet, as the Human Rights Watch report asserts, "[m]any Americans think
of workers' organizing, collective bargaining, and strikes solely as union-
versus-management disputes that do not raise human rights concerns.' ' 9
Many are not even aware that they are required by law. All people in this
country, not only law-makers and policy-makers, need to understand the
moral as well as legal issues involved in labor law and its implementation.
48. See Gross, supra note 11 for a thorough discussion.
49. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 46, at 7.
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Americans need to understand more than the rules of labor law; they need
to understand the values underlying those rules. They need to understand,
as well, that there are fundamental human rights at issue here and that their
decisions about those rights will ultimately determine what kind of people
they are and what kind of society they have.
As I said at the outset of this piece, the basic foundation of labor
policy is moral choice. The fundamental purpose of labor policy is not
efficiency or productivity, but to find a moral basis for achieving human
dignity, human solidarity and self-sufficiency, and justice for all people at
workplaces and in the larger communities affected by what goes on at those
workplaces. Comprehending and promulgating the values of the Wagner
Act as human rights is where we need to begin.
